We construct an equilibrium on-the-job search model in which workers value wages and amenities. We show by example that in a standard (Burdett/Mortensen) model with a distribution of worker tastes over amenities, worker mobility need not imply equilibrium wage dispersion.
Introduction
Models of on-the-job search o¤er an explanation for wage di¤erentials across identical workers. With on-the-job search, …rms can be indi¤erent between low and high wage o¤ers. A …rm that o¤ers a low wage has di¢ culty attracting and retaining workers, but its pro…t per worker employed is relatively high. A …rm that o¤ers a high wage …nds it easier to attract and retain workers, but its pro…t per worker employed is relatively low. On-the-job search thus introduces the "volume-margin tradeo¤" that lies behind theories of equilibrium wage dispersion.
In most models of on-the-job search, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998), a worker's decision to move from one …rm to another is based solely on the wages o¤ered by the two …rms. However, non-wage characteristics likely also play an important role. (See Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009 , and Sullivan and To, 2014, for empirical evidence.) A worker may prefer …rm A to …rm B even though B o¤ers a higher wage if he or she prefers the amenities associated with …rm A to those associated with …rm B.
In this note, we examine an equilibrium model of on-the-job search in which workers care both about wages and about job-speci…c amenities. We use a framework de…ned by two further assumptions. The …rst is that workers have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage characteristics, i.e., we assume "horizontal"rather than "vertical"di¤erentiation across job amenities. Second, we assume that worker preferences over these amenities are private information. These assumptions imply that …rms cannot use their wage o¤ers to "price" the non-wage characteristics of their jobs. 1 We focus on a particular question, namely, when workers care about both wages and amenities, does on-the-job search necessarily lead to equilibrium wage dispersion as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) ? The answer is "no." Using a uniform distribution, we show by example that if preferences over the amenity are su¢ ciently dispersed, there is an equilibrium in which all …rms post the same wage. 1 Other models of equilibrium search in which workers care both about wages and amenities include Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) and Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986) . In Hwang et al. (1998) , workers all have the same known preferences over amenities. Amenities can thus be priced, so the model is one of compensating di¤erentials as in Rosen (1986) , and the equilibrium is essentially that of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) except that …rms o¤er ‡ow utilities rather than wages. Albrecht and Jovanovic (1986) make the same assumptions (horizontal di¤erentiation, private information) that we do but without incorporating on-the-job search. That paper compares the equilibrium job acceptance decision of the unemployed in a random search model like ours to the corresponding decision in a competitive search benchmark.
Model
We use the simplest version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) as our starting point. Time is continuous, and only steady states are considered. There are unit masses of homogeneous workers and homogeneous …rms, and all agents have a zero rate of time preference. Firms live forever. They receive revenue p per worker employed per unit of time and maximize expected steady-state ‡ow pro…t. Workers have …nite lives, exiting the market at Poisson rate : These exits are o¤set by the entry of new workers into unemployment. Job o¤ers arrive at Poisson rate ; the same whether employed or unemployed, and jobs end (workers move from employment to unemployment) at Poisson rate : Workers maximize expected lifetime payo¤s.
When a job o¤er arrives, the worker draws a match-speci…c ‡ow payo¤ (amenity), ", and the …rm o¤ers a wage w on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The amenity is a random draw from an exogenous continuous distribution function (") with corresponding density ("); which is symmetric around zero with support [ "; "]. The realization of this draw is the worker's private information. Wage o¤ers are distributed across …rms according to an endogenous distribution function F (w) with support [w; w]: A worker who accepts a job o¤ering wage w and amenity " realizes a ‡ow payo¤ of z = w + " for the duration of the match. Convolution then gives a continuous distribution of ‡ow payo¤s across job o¤ers:
Unemployed workers receive ‡ow payo¤ b < p: An unemployed worker thus accepts a job o¤er if and only if its ‡ow payo¤, z; is at least as great as b: An employed worker accepts a new job if and only if its ‡ow payo¤ is strictly greater than the current job's ‡ow payo¤. We begin by characterizing the relevant steady states. Using these steady state measures, we then derive …rms'steady-state ‡ow pro…ts. Let u denote the steady-state measure of unemployed workers. The in ‡ow to unemployment during any time interval of length dt equals the ‡ow of workers from employment into unemployment plus the new entrants who replace workers who exit the market from employment, i.e., ( + )dt(1 u). The corresponding out ‡ow is dt(1 H(b))u, so in steady state,
Next, let G(z) denote the proportion of employed workers receiving ‡ow payo¤ of z or less. Note that G(z) = 0 for z < b . Hence, for z b; the in ‡ow of unemployed workers to employment with a payo¤ z or less is dt[H(z) H(b)]u. The out ‡ow is given by those workers who exit the market or were displaced from employment or who received an o¤er with a payo¤ greater than z, i.e., [ + + (1 H(z))]dtG(z)(1 u); so in steady state,
Now consider a …rm o¤ering a wage w such that w + " b; and let L(zjw) denote the steady state number of workers receiving ‡ow payo¤ z in this …rm. The ‡ow of such workers into the …rm in any time interval of length dt consists of the unemployed workers who contacted the …rm and drew a match-speci…c payo¤ " = z w b plus the employed workers with ‡ow payo¤ less than z who contacted the …rm and drew the same " = z w: The hiring in ‡ow is thus dt [u + (1 u)G(z)] (z w) while the corresponding out ‡ow is [ + + (1 H(z))]dtL(zjw). Substituting (2) and (3) into the hiring rate and equating in ‡ows to out ‡ows gives
This describes the steady state number of workers with ‡ow payo¤ z employed at a …rm o¤ering w b ": A …rm o¤ering wage w thus has an expected labor force of
and an expected steady-state pro…t of
The lower limit in the integral de…ning L(w) re ‡ects the facts that (i) no worker will accept a job o¤ering z < b and (ii) the lowest ‡ow payo¤ at a …rm o¤ering w is w ": Each …rm chooses its wage to maximize (w) given the distribution of wages posted by other …rms and the optimal search strategy of workers. Let = max w (w):
Equilibrium
De…nition: An equilibrium is a quadruple fu; F; G; Hg such that (i) workers search optimally given H; (ii) u; G and H are consistent with steady state given wage o¤ ers F and optimal worker search; (iii) …rms choose wages to maximize (w) given the all other …rms' wage o¤ ers and the optimal search strategy of workers.; i.e., (w) = for all w where dF (w) > 0;
(w) for all w where dF (w) = 0:
As p > b, each …rm can o¤er a wage that attracts some workers and makes positive expected pro…t. That is, in equilibrium > 0.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that when is degenerate, the equilibrium wage o¤er distribution cannot have mass points. If there were a mass point, say atw < p, a …rm o¤eringw would strictly increase its expected pro…t by o¤eringw + , where > 0 is arbitrarily small. This deviation would increase the hiring rate of the …rm discontinuously, while the pro…t per hire would decrease continuously. However, when workers' job acceptance decisions also depend on a continuously distributed matchspeci…c component, as considered here, the hiring rate no longer need be discontinuous at a mass point. Hence, one cannot a priori rule out the possibility of mass points in F .
In the next section we analyze the conditions under which a single-masspoint equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, all …rms o¤er the same wage and workers change jobs purely due to their preferences over amenities. To illustrate this we restrict our analysis to the case in which is uniform on [ "; "]:
3 Single-wage equilibrium Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all …rms o¤er a wage w 0 . Let L(w; w 0 ) be the expected workforce of a potential deviant o¤ering wage w; and let (w; w 0 ) be the corresponding expected pro…t ‡ow. Since F is degenerate at w 0 ; we have H(z) = (z w 0 ): Thus
In a single-wage equilibrium, there is a unique w 0 such that w 0 = arg max (w; w 0 ): A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a unique single-wage equilibrium is therefore the existence of a unique w 0 such that 0 (w 0 ; w 0 ) = 0 and 00 (w 0 ; w 0 ) < 0:
Whether such an equilibrium exists depends, of course, on the distribution of the match-speci…c amenity. If, in particular, the distribution of " is degenerate at zero (the case considered in Burdett and Mortensen 1998), then a single-wage equilibrium does not exist. For other amenity distributions, however, a single-wage equilibrium does exist. We illustrate this by considering the case in which " is uniform on [ "; "]: In this case, we show that if the amenity distribution is su¢ ciently dispersed, i.e., if " is su¢ -ciently large, then an equilibrium exists in which all …rms post the same wage. Speci…cally, we show
Then there exists a unique single-wage equilibrium.
To verify this, we proceed as follows. Let w 0 be the candidate equilibrium wage, and let z 0 = w 0 " and z 0 = w 0 + " be the lowest and highest ‡ow payo¤s workers can achieve in the candidate equilibrium. Since " is uniform on [ "; "]; we have (z w) = 1=2" and (z w 0 ) = (z w 0 + ")=2". Assuming that z 0 b (an assumption that we will show follows from the restriction placed above on "), the expected steady-state pro…t for a …rm posting wage w when all other …rms post w 0 is (w; w 0 ) = (p w)
Note that (w; w 0 ) = 0 for w + " b (since no workers will accept a wage below b) and that (w; w 0 ) 0 for w p: That is, the …rm's optimal wage must lie in [b "; p]:
Using a change of variable and integrating,
Di¤erentiating with respect to w and letting a = 2"( + ) then gives
(7) Any critical value w must therefore solve the quadratic equation
In any candidate equilibrium w 0 b ", so evaluating 0 (w; w 0 ) at w = b "
Since (i) 0 (b "; w 0 ) > 0; (ii) (b "; w 0 ) = (p; w 0 ) = 0; and (iii) (8) is a quadratic equation, it follows that there is a unique w 2 (b "; p) that solves equation (8) and that this critical value maximizes rather than minimizes the …rm's expected pro…t.
The …nal step is to …nd a w 0 that is its own best response. To do so we solve equation (8) letting w = w 0 . The equilibrium w 0 then solves
To show that a unique solution exists, note that the LHS of equation (9),
; is a strictly decreasing linear function of w 0 that goes
; is a strictly increasing and concave function that goes
> 0. Continuity of 1 and 2 implies a unique intersection. That is, there exists a unique w 0 that solves equation (9). The wage w 0 maximizes each …rm's steady-state expected pro…t given that all other …rms post w 0 : Finally, we provisionally assumed that z 0 b. Equation (9) gives a parametric restriction on " such that this inequality holds, namely, " From equation (9), w 0 is decreasing in ": Thus, as " increases, z 0 = w 0 " decreases, and the assumption that z 0 b remains valid.
Conclusion
In this note, we have constructed an equilibrium on-the-job search model in which workers care about both wages and amenities. We have shown by example that in a standard on-the-job search model, worker mobility need not imply equilibrium wage dispersion.
